PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
AND FACTFINDING
PRECISION
MIRJAN DAMASKAt

For at least a century a debate has been raging about the
relative advantages of the adversary and nonadversary presentations of evidence as tools in the quest for the truth.' Most of the
time this debate proceeded in a mild sfumato of conceptual ambiguity: Differences in the styles of developing evidence were
often conflated with differences in arrangements concerning the
collection of evidence, admissibility rules, and similar related issues. Beyond that, until quite recently, the arguments advanced
were speculative, and information was exclusively in the form of
impressions and intuitive insights. In our age, so enamoured of
scientific methodology and so desirous of replacing "soft" by
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
In the Anglo-American legal culture the discussion of the two manners of prooftaking can easily be traced at least as far as Jeremy Bentham. It is rather difficult,
however, to find proponents of the continental style of taking evidence among English
and American writers. For a somewhat critical view see R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE
LAW 318, 344 (3d ed. 1970). Even Bentham, so critical of the common law system in
many respects, praised the English tradition for "giving the parties the power of examining witnesses." See J. BENTHAM, A. TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 105 (1825). On tile
Continent of Europe, the debate about the relative merits of the two evidentiary styles
was especially lively after the revolutionary upheavals in the nineteenth century German
states. The French revolutionary reforms of 1791 took place much too early to produce a
debate on the merits of cross-examination. So strong was the attraction of English institutions in post-1848 Germany, that a provision permitting cross-examination found its way
into § 239 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877. See THE GERMAN CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 239 (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 10, H.

Niebler transl. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GERMAN CODE]. Old tradition prevailed, however, and to the present day this provision, while always a possibility, is simply not used in
actual practice. See T. KLEINKNECHT, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 571 (2d ed. 1970). On the
vicissitudes of the idea of cross-examination in Germany see J. HERR.MANN, DIE REFORM
DER DEUTSCHEN HAUPTVERHANDLUNG

NACH

DEM VORBILD DES ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN

STRAFVERFAHRENS 55-141, 336 (1971). The present author is familiar with an abortive
experiment in the 1960's before a Croatian court, in that constituent republic of Yugoslavia, to introduce examination by the parties-in lieu of the traditional judicial examination. This experiment was inspired by the then Chief Justice who, upon his return
from America, was very much impressed by the art of cross-examination. This brief
episode, poorly prepared, ended in a fiasco.
Examination by the parties, albeit quite differently structured from the AngloAmerican variation, can be found in only a few continental jurisdictions. Scandinavian
countries and Spain follow this pattern. See id. 395-96.
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"hard" data, the question almost naturally arises: can at least
some themes involved in the debate be translated into a form
susceptible of empirical analysis? If the answer is in the affirmative, perhaps products of disinterested science can replace our
prejudice, parochialism, and irrational attachments to existing
arrangements, no matter how "efficient" these existing arrangements may be. In the present Article I propose to express my
reflections on this subject, reflections that were stimulated by a
in a series of recent, thought-propiece of research presented
2
voking empirical studies.
My discussion will be in three parts. In the first I shall deal
with a number of conceptual preliminaries. Although this part
will have its longueurs, our modern eagerness for empirical information must not blind us to the need for careful theoretical
preparation before we descend to the empirical plane. Also, as
we shall later see, it is mainly through their theoretical underpinnings that values are smuggled into supposedly value-free
research paradigms. The second part will analyze briefly the
study that provoked me to write these lines, and then go on to
offer a prospectus for another empirical study of proof-taking
styles. Finally, in the third part, I shall assume that reliable empirical information has been obtained from my suggested prospectus. The significance of such knowledge will then be canvassed from the perspective of the epistemology of the criminal
process. I shall concentrate here on the possibility that the "reality" we try to ascertain through evidentiary activity need not be
exactly the same in different systems of administering justice.
I.

THEORETICAL PROPAEDEUTIC

A. PreliminaryRemarks on the Object of Proof
The problem whether the adversary or the nonadversary
mode of presenting evidence is better equipped to lead to the
truth cannot be analyzed in vacuo. "Truth about what?" is the
question that must be answered at the very outset. It must be
2 Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, Adversary Pesentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86
HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972). This study is part of the product of the project "Human
Behavior and the Legal Process," supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation..\dditional pieces of research have been described in a number of subsequent
articles. See Lind, Thibaut, & Walker, DiscoverY and PresentationoJ Evidence in Adversa)y and
L. REV. 1129 (1973); Walker, Thibaut, & Andreoli,
Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MiH.
O~der of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216 (1972).
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determined with sufficient precision what is the referent to
which the characterization "truth" or "falsity" applies.
Following in the path of the studies mentioned a moment
ago, I shall be concerned solely with issues involved in arriving at
a judgment concerning the guilt or innocence of the criminal
defendant. But this restriction is far from sufficiently precise. To
begin with, consider that the issues disposed of in a judgment do
not all have the same epistemological status: The meaning of the
symbol "truth" changes considerably as we attach it to its different component parts.
As background for my quick reconnaissance over familiar
terrain, imagine a manslaughter charge arising out of reckless
driving. The decisionmaker must determine the truth of a certain number of propositions regarding "external facts," such as
the speed of the automobile, the condition of the road, the traffic signals, the driver's identity, and so on. The mental operations required to ascertain such "external facts" belong primarily
to the sphere of sensory experience. The inquiry here appears to
be relatively objective, 3 and the "truth" about such facts does not
seem to be too elusive.4
But many "internal facts" will also have to be established
in the imagined case. They regard aspects of the defendant's
knowledge and volition, to the extent to which these are important for the application of the relevant legal standard. The ascertainment of such facts is already a far less objective undertaking than the ascertainment of facts derived by the senses:
processes of inductive inference from external facts are the
most frequently traveled cognitive road. Even so, we do not
hesitate to accord roughly the same cognitive status to findings
regarding these internal facts as we do to findings of external
facts. The characterizations "true" and "false" retain their
respective meanings.
The situation changes, however, when the facts ascertained
must be assessed in the light of the legal standard. Whether a
3I
say relatively objective, for an element of subjectivity suftuses even such
psychological activities as perception. The latter has been shown to be far from a passive
registration of stimuli: it depends on interests, previous habits, even on the creative act of
grasping structures, thus implying a degree of inferential construction. Implications of
the "creativity" of perception have been traced in various areas. See R. ARNHEIM, Perceptional Abstractions and Art, in TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF ART 27, 33 (1972); T. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

126 (2d ed. 1970).

1 In saying that truth is not too elusive I assume that the decisionmaker has at his
disposal reliable informational sources (evidence).
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driver has deviated from certain standards of care-and if so to
what degree-are problems calling for a different type of mental
operation than that used in dealing with external facts. It is, of
course, a matter of free semantic choice whether to characterize
the outcome of legal evaluation as "true" or "false," or to use
some other pair of symbols. But if one decides to stick with the
former, he must recognize that these symbols acquire a different
meaning in the new context. In essence they convey the idea that
the result of the activity is either correct (coherent) or incorrect
5
(incoherent) within a given framework of legal reference.
Additional issues, whose characterization is exceedingly
complex, arise under the Anglo-American system of adjudication, especially in connection with the adjudicator's powers of
nullification. 6 But what I have said so far suffices to indicate that
the question about the truth or falsity of a judgment as such,
without further specification, is too ambiguous to be meaningful.
Notwithstanding marginal uncertainties and philosophical
arguments on some aspects of this problem, it is generally
agreed that the presentation of evidence is directed toward establishing the veracity of factual propositions, rather than the
correctness of legal reasoning.' In what follows I shall therefore,
be restricted solely to the factual segment of the judgment, as the
only proper object of proof-taking. Within this factual segment,
the problems of findings regarding external facts will bulk
largest. They seem a very convenient object of empirical study,
• The distinction between law and fact is often thought to entail the epistemological
distinction between fact and value. Fortunately, my purposes do not require me to enter
into this difficult and very controversial philosophical issue. Those who agree with my
distinction in the text need not take extreme views on the ontological status of values. On
such 'iews see W.K. Frankena, Value and Valuation, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
229, 231 (1967). On the other hand, even those who claim that they have resolved the
Kantian antinomy between the cognitive and the moral will usually admit that-at least
for the moment-this dichotomy cannot be obviated. See, e.g., S. AvINERI, THE SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 69 (1968). whatever the philosophical positions
on the problem, modern legal systems usually mandate a different approach toward
factual and legal determinations (e.g., in cases of factual as opposed to legal uncertainty).
I Imagine, as an illustration, that the minority view of Judge Bazelon in United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1972), expressed the true nature of
jury nullification. The latter would then involve a "fine tuning" of crude decisional
standards. This tuning would, of course, be one-sided, i.e., it would proceed only in favor
of the defendant. How, then, can the verdict that disregards the legal instructions be
classified? Is it "correct" within the legal universe? Where should the line between ethics
and the law now be drawn?
As the reader knows, a legal proposition may sometimes be made an object of
prool But the aim of the evidentiary activity is to prove that a rule exists, and not that a
certain legal solution is aplpropriate in the case.
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in that the processes of their determination are relatively objective.
Where empirical research is contemplated, is this restriction
to the factual segment of the adjudicatory activity a workable
proposition? Can this segment be extirpated from the whole in
any fashion other than through logical analysis? This thought
occurs quite naturally to lawyers in the Anglo-American legal
culture, where the largely inscrutable jury verdict is so central.
But even in continental systems, where decisionmakers are, as a
rule, required to provide separate reasons for factual findings
and legal determinations, skepticism can easily arise. The mandate to write separate reasons can easily be viewed as implying
rationalizations: what is in reality intertwined is presented postfestum in two neatly separated categories. It is indeed the most
sophisticated modern view on the continent that, in arriving at a
judgment, the mind of the decisionmaker constantly travels from
facts to law and back to facts again, in a simulacrum of regenerative feedback. 8
The constant interaction between fact and law thus cannot be
denied. It poses serious problems for the empirical study of the
factual segment of adjudication in isolation. If the actual criminal litigation were the object of study, these problems would be
insuperable.9 But there is another strategy of research. The presentation of evidence can be observed at simulated trials, under
controlled laboratory conditions, and under this method the activity may be limited to factual issues only, even to the determination of external facts. And it is this methodology of laboratory
experimentation that I shall analyze in the next part.
It cannot be denied that the separation of the factual from
the totality necessarily infects the results of the study with an
element of artificiality and distortion. The latter element is more
pronounced in the Anglo-American system, where the place of
8 The traditional syllogistic view is moribund, notwithstanding attempts at artificial
respiration applied to it by some continental theorists. The view of sophisticated modern
writers may be stated briefly as follows. You cannot decide which facts matter unless you
have already selected, at least tentatively, applicable decisional standards. But most of the
time you cannot properly understand these legal standards without relating them to the
factual situation of the case. For a brilliant analysis of this circularity, see Kaufmann,
Ueber den Zirkelschlhss in der Rechtsfindung, in FEsTscHRIFr FUR WILHELM GALLAS 17-19 (K.
Lackner, H. Leferenz, E. Schmidt, J. Welp, & A. Wolf eds. 1973). See also K. LARENZ,
METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 471 (2d ed. 1969).
9 But, for independent reasons, actual systems can hardly be studied to determine
the accuracy of their adjudicative outcomes. A formidable problem is how to determine
the reality against which the actual disposition of cases could be matched.
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the factual in the whole of the adjudication is less certain than on
the continent. But this is hardly news to the scientist who deals
with parts of totality all the time. It only means to him that the
results must be interpreted with reserve and caution.
But here I am getting ahead of my story; later I shall have
more to say about the significance of possible empirical data in
this field. In this part, dealing with conceptual preliminaries, I
must first turn to the opposition between adversary and nonadversary proof-taking.
B.

Two ContrastingModes of Developing Evidence

Let me then try to present in some detail what is involved in
the opposition of the two proof-taking styles. Because the standard against which the two procedural arrangements are to be
studied is to be their relative suitability to lead to the truth, 10 I
will focus my discussion on those facets that are most relevant to
truth determination. Although my method here necessarily implies a degree of imprecision in depicting a much more complex
phenomenon, for the sake of brevity I shall limit my discussion
to the development of evidence through the examination of
witnesses. 1 '
1. The Nonadversary Mode
Under this variant, there are no separate witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense. All witnesses are evidentiary
sources of the bench, and it is the judge, not the parties, who has
the primary duty to obtain information from them. The parties
are not supposed to try to affect, let alone to prepare, the witnesses' testimony at trial. "Coaching" witnesses comes danger10Perhaps the reader should be reminded at this point that the divergent manners
of presenting evidence do not exhaust the wide range of evidentiary and procedural
variations in the Anglo-American adversary and the continental nonadversary systems.
In fact, this contrast is not nearly as important as many others, and probably not even
essential to the dichotomy. Remaining within the narrow sphere of factfinding, suffice it
to indicate that the opposition between court and party control over whatfacts are to be
determined, and the contrast between the unilateral and bilateral collection of evidence,
both generate differences dwarfing those springing from the divergent manner of developing evidence at trial.
11 Here I shall not consider the special problem of expert testimony. On this problem see Jescheck, Germany, in THE ACCUSED: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 246, 252 (J. Coutts
ed. 1966); Mueller, The Position of the Criminal Defendant in the United States, id. 87, 112.
For an optimistic perspective on the reconciliation of forensic advocacy and technical and
scientific testimony see Wolfgang, The Social Scientist in Court, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 239
(1974).
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ously close to various criminal offenses of interfering with the
2
administration of justice.'
At trial, the witness is first asked by the judge to present a
narrative account of what he knows about the facts of the case.
His story will be interrupted by questions from the bench only to
help the witness express himself, to clarify a point, or to steer the
witness back from the labyrinth of utter irrelevancy.' 3 Only
when this very informal communication comes to an end does
the judge proceed to the interrogation. But even this interrogation process may sometimes strike an Anglo-American observer
as more of an informal conversation than a rigorous succession
of questions and short answers. Some of the questions go to the
credibility of the witness and serve, to a moderate extent, as a
functional equivalent of cross-examination.' 4 When the interrogation from the bench has been completed, the two parties are
permitted to address questions to the witness, in an attempt to
bring out omitted aspects favorable to them, or to add emphasis
to certain points on which testimony has already been obtained.
In brief, the bulk of information is obtained through judicial
interrogation, and only a few informational crumbs are left to
the parties.
But how can the judge effectively interrogate? It stands to
reason that there can be no meaningful interrogation unless the
examiner has at least some conception of the case and at least
some knowledge about the role of the witness in it. Thus, under
the nonadversary mode of developing evidence, the judge is typically given a file (dossier) containing summaries of what potential witnesses know about the case sub judice.
12 In a number of continental countries this practice is also contrary to professional
canons of ethics, no matter how fantastic this may seem to American lawyers. See, e.g., R.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 307-08.
" The paucity of continental rules on what is admissible evidence permits such an
informal arrangement. In some continental countries the failure to permit the witness to
offer a narrative account may constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 11,
1952, 3 BGHSt. 281, 284 (dictum) (West Germany).
14 For provisions on the manner of examining witnesses see the following criminal
procedural codes: THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 331-32 (The American

Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 7, J. Moreau & G. Mueller transl. 1960); GERMAN
CODE, supra note 1, § 69; C. PRO. PEN. arts. 349-59 (7th ed. R. Alessandri 1973) (Italy);
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR arts. 150, 158, in SOVIET CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES (2d ed. H. Berman & J. Spindler transl. 1972);
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 216 (Collection of Yugoslav Laws No. 19, M. Damaska

transl. 1969) (Yugoslavia).
For the flavor of the examination, as perceived
BEDFORD, THE FACES OFJUSTICE 166-77 (1961).

by an Englishwoman, see S.
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It is easy to see what lies at the core of the described manner
of presenting evidence. The decisionmaker is active; he uses the
informational sources himself. Information does not reach him
in the form of two one-sided accounts; he strives to reconstruct
the "whole story" directly.
After the proof-taking phase of the trial is over, the predominantly unilateral style of proceeding comes to an end. Then
summations of facts and legal argumentation must be presented. Each side makes his own one-sided assessment of the
evidence heard and advances his legal arguments. Exchange is
permitted, but the defense must have the last word. 15 Before the
bench retires, the defendant is given the chance to make a final
statement, which usually contains a potpourri of what can be
classified as testimonial statements and exhortations to render
certain decisions.
2.

The Adversary Mode

Under this arrangement, each party calls his own witnesses
and tries to obtain from them information favorable to his case.
In order to do this effectively, the party must often prepare the
witness for the court appearance; what is later to be testimony is
often told in the lawyer's office first. After one party has elicited
information from his witness, his adversary takes over the interrogation process. Now the reliability of the other party's witness
will be questioned, or an attempt will be made to obtain from
him reliable information in favor of the cross-examiner's thesis.
And it is through such rival use of evidentiary sources that the
factfinding stage of the trial unfolds.
It is true that this adversary presentation may be moderated
by the intervention of the factfinder, if he happens to be a
judge. 16 He can ask questions that "cry out to be asked," or he
may obtain immediate clarification of points from the perspective of his cognitive. needs. But this judicial intrusion into an
adversary development is necessarily limited. Too extensive an
intervention may lead to reversal of the judgment. Apart from
this consideration, it is exceedingly hard for a judge to ask mean15It would be erroneous to assume, however, that there will be, in a typical case, a
heated partisan argument between the prosecution and the defense. On the impact of
the order of presentation see Walker, Thibaut, & Andreoli, supra note 2.
16 The jury is largely doomed to passivity, at least until the trial is over. This fact is
important from the point of view of experimental psychology. See note 24 infra & accompanying text.
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ingful questions, innocent as he must be of any prior knowledge
17
of the case.
The essence of this second arrangement is obvious: The
decisionmaker is passive, and the informational sources are
tapped by two procedural rivals. The information about the facts
of the case reaches the adjudicator in the form of two alternating
one-sided accounts.
C. The Perspective of Experimental Witness Psychology
As I am interested in the problem of which of the two described arrangements leads to more accurate factual findings,
the insights offered by experimental psychology become valuable. 18 And it is just one of many melancholy facts unraveled
by this relatively young discipline that all interrogation techniques exert some distorting influences. It is true that we operate
tolerably well with rough approximations of what scientists
would demand of factfinding precision, and that the psychological pitfalls of the interrogation process can easily be exaggerated.
Even so, in their most diluted form, psychological caveats contain sobering messages of humility vis-&-vis our sometimes revered and often overrated techniques of using witnesses. Paraphrasing Dr. Johnson's observation about the lady preacher,
one would say that the remarkable thing is not how perfect
one or the other arrangement is, but rather that it operates at
reasonably tolerable levels.
Let me first allude to a number of problems with the
nonadversary mode of developing testimonial evidence. It will be
17 Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. Rev. 1031, 1042
(1975). Thefelix culpa of the continental judge is, of course, that he has the dossier of the
case before him.
18 Experimental psychology is quite a flourishing forensic discipline on the continent
of Europe. Courses on this subject are offered in law schools, or, at the minimum, in
courses on criminal procedure some time is devoted to elementary psychological insights
into the sources of inaccurate testimony. Sporadically, courts call upon psychologists to
assess the reliability of testimony. This is controversial, however, and is usually limited to
juvenile proceedings. See, e.g.,Judgment of Dec. 14, 1954, 7 BGHST. 82 (West Germany).
See also Blau, DER STRAFRECHTLER UND DER PSYCHOLOGISCHE SACHVERSTANDIGE, in 78
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DIE GESAITE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 153 (1966).
Probably the most widely known continental text on witness psychology is still 0.
M6NKEILLER, PSYCHOLOGIE UND PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DER AUSSAGE (1930). The best
known French authority on the matter is F. GORPHE, L'APPR11CIATION DES PREUVES EN
JUSTICE (1947). For a recent contribution to the field, translated into English, see A.
TRANKELL, RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE (1972). It must be emphasized that many of these
books report, in addition to experimental data, a great deal of intuitive and impressionistic information. The extent to which much of it has been anticipated by Jeremy Bentham
is striking. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 20-29.
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recalled that the judge must have some prior knowledge of the
case in order to become an effective interrogator at trial. But his
necessary prior knowledge is, at the same time, a considerable
shortcoming from the epistemological point of view. Being
somewhat familiar with the case, the judge inevitably forms certain tentative hypotheses about the reality he is called upon to
reconstruct. More or less imperceptibly, these preconceptions influence the kinds of questions he addresses to witnesses. More
importantly, there is an ever-present danger that the judge will
be more receptive to information conforming to his hypotheses
than to that which clashes with them. 19 Although the resulting
dangers to accurate decisionmaking are somewhat decreased by
the fact that judges are usually aware of this distorting psychological mechanism, the shortcomings of this arrangement
20
cannot be entirely eliminated.
Consider now the adversary manner of developing evidence. It is designed in such a way that the art of suspended
judgment can be practiced for a much longer period of time by
the adjudicators. They are not driven by the duty to lead an
inquiry into forming early tentative theories about the facts of
the case. This is, of course, an advantage of the adversary mode.
There may be yet another one, although it is much less certain in
terms of experimental witness psychology. It is possible that an
interrogator "hostile" to the witness may be in a better position
to bring out potential conscious or unconscious distortion
mechanisms inherent in his testimony (e.g., inaccurate perception, faulty memory images, mystifications, etc.).
19 Even among experimental psychologists much of this insight is actually intuitive.
See J. HERRMANN, supra note 1, at 363; A. TRANKELL, supra note 18, at 27-28; Fuller, The
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 43, 44 (H. Berman ed. 1971). Among
statisticians this danger is referred to as the danger of "sampling error". See Lind,
Thibaut, & Walker, supra note 2, at 1142. It must be borne in mind, however, that there
is an independent danger that the judge will be predisposed in favor of a hypothesis of
guilt, even before he has learned anything about the case. "It has often been observed,"
says Bentham, "that judges, in consequence of their very office of being accustomed to
see criminals, and to believe readily in the existence of crime, are generally prejudiced
against the accused ....
J. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 105.

20 See, e.g., Jescheck, supra note 11, at 247. Some continental lawyers, familiar with

the Anglo-American system-possibly with a touch of an idealistic view of it-go so far as
to call the position of the judge who conducts the examination "psychologically unbearable". J. HERRMANN, supra note 1, at 362. But their recommended model, although closer
to the Anglo-American style, must not be associated with the latter. This is so not only
because the law of evidence is so different on the continent, but also because even those
who hold outr6 views are not prepared to desert the continental paradigm in its attitude
toward the discovery of the truth.
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But all this is only part of the story: there are important
cognitive costs of the adversary arrangements. As this darker
view of the cathedral is seldom illuminated, 2 ' let us explore various epistemological pitfalls that lie in the tactical wake of letting
two adversaries control the development of evidence at trial. I do
not propose here to start the reader on an extended tour of
experimental psychology relevant to problems of the rival use of
evidentiary sources. It is enough for my limited purposes to call
attention to a few of the most salient shortcomings of this arrangement, assuming, at all times, that the parties are not engaging in unethical practices.
It may be in the narrow interest of only one party, or in the
common interest of both, that some items of information which
the witness possesses do not reach the adjudicator-even though
their relevancy in the quest for the truth is beyond dispute.
Evidence unsupportive of one's case has no function in the adversary litigation process, nor do matters which the parties decide to leave out of the disputation. And, as the witness is limited
to answering relatively narrow and precise qeustions, much information may effectively be kept away from the decisionmaker
who presumably is responsible for finding the truth within the
limits of the charge. Accordingly, the factual basis for the deci22
sion may be incomplete.
21But see, e.g., Frankel, supra note 17 (sharp critique of "partisan manipulation" in
the use of evidence).
22 1 assume that the total number of facts to be established and the total number of
evidentiary sources to be used, is the same tinder both systems discussed. In other words,
many variables that influence the completeness of the factual and evidentiary materials
submitted to the decisionmaker are held constant tinder the adversary and nonadversarv
trial processes. The remark in the text on the completeness of material only refers to the
possibility that, as a result of different styles of examining witnesses, the quantum of
information obtained from the same witness may be unequal tinder the two arrangements: the discrepancy between what the witness knows and what he communicates to
the decisionmaker may vary significantly under the two modes of developing evidence.
Let me allude parenthetically, however, to three important variables of crucial importance for the larger problem whether the factual basis for the adjudication of guilt is
equal tinder the adversary and nonadversary systems of structuring the trial.
The first variable concerns the range o1 facts that the decisionmakers have to determine. Under the adversary system of trial, the parties may agree not to submit certain
facts to the decisionmaker even though these facts are within the compass of a charge.
Or, one party may decide not to raise an issue relevant to the charge (e.g., a defense).
Both these practices are alien to the nonadversary system, in which inter-party arrangements concerning facts are prohibited, and in which it is the court's duty to extend its
inquiry to all relevant facts within the limits of the charge.
The second variable involves the different strategies of the search for evidence. Under
the adversary system, the parties collect evidence to support their respective theses.
Under the nonadversary model, the gathering of evidence is primarily the duty of a state
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But there are much more important costs of the development of evidence through rival use of informational sources.
The damage to testimony inflicted by the preparation of witnesses is very serious. Parties can hardly be expected to interview the potential witnesses in relatively detached ways that
minimize the damage of interrogation to memory images. During the sessions devoted to "coaching," the future witness is
likely to try to adapt himself to expectations mirrored in the
interviewer's one-sided attitude. As a consequence, gaps in his
memory may even unconsciously be filled out by what he thinks
accords with the lawyer's expectations and are in tune with his
thesis. Later, in court, these additions to memory images may
appear to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his
original perceptions.2 3 Another important cost accompanies the
cross-examination technique, which, with its challenge to the
credibility of witnesses, is a two-edged sword. As Judge Frankel
has noted, it is "to a considerable degree . . .like other potent
weapons, equally lethal for heroes and villains. ' 24 Even with the
best of intentions on the cross-examiner's part, reliable testimony
may easily be made to look debatable, and clear information may
become obfuscated.
Finally, observe the procedural position of the passive decisionmaker. It is old hat in experimental psychology that people
agency. Obviously, different problems of transmitting information about detected evidence spring from this variation: the adversaries are often reluctant to exchange information about the evidence discovered, while the nonadversary agency entrusted with
preparation of the case for trial will, as a rule, transmit all it has unearthed to the court.
The third variable involves different rules of admissibility. Under the adversary
system much logically relevant and cognitively valuable information never reaches the
factfinder, while the filtering mechanism in the nonadversary system is much cruder.
What is the cumulative effect of these and other variables? It is probably that the
total volume of information under the nonadversary system is somewhat greater (assuming that the number of relevant facts is the same). But this does not preclude the
possibility that the information obtained under the nonadversary process is less reliable.
Problems of "sampling error" may vary greatly in adversary and nonadversary contexts.
" See, e.g., A. TRANKELL, supra note 18, at 27-29. It is true that this process takes
place in all interrogation, but the less one-sided the examination the smaller the danger
of distortion. Consider the damage inflicted by leading questions alone, which are strictly
prohibited to the interrogator under the continental systems.
24 See Frankel, supra note 17, at 1039. There is the further subtle psychological problem to which I can only allude: the clash between rehearsed testimony obtained during
examination-in-chief and the spontaneity of statements obtained on cross-examination.
Only one of the ramifications here is surprise. No doubt sudden twists add color, spectacularity, and drama to proceedings, but what is optimal from the point of view of
psychology often requires rather boring arrangements, closer to the general continental
style.
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display different cognitive needs; they try to reach knowledge
and understanding along different paths. It therefore stands to
reason that decisionmakers may sometimes require a different
method of presentation than that of the clash of two one-sided
versions, and that, at a psychologically crucial point, they would
sometimes like to ask a specific question of a witness, which in
25
their passivity they cannot do.
Even this brief digression into experimental psychology
clearly shows that it is treacherous to make definitive pronouncements about which of the two manners of presenting
evidence is a more effective tool in the search for the truth.
Speculation about these problems is made even more intractable
because the narrow epistemological problem involved can hardly
ever be totally separated from a cluster of attitudes and values
comprising the larger legal culture. It is thus easy to make impressive speculative arguments on either side of the divide
separating the two great modern systems of criminal justice,
apotheosizing one or the other proof-taking style. Can this debate be made more objective? More particularly, can empirical
tests tell us which evidentiary arrangement, if either, leads to a
better approximation of the evanescent reality that we seek to
reconstruct in the criminal process? The answer to this question
takes me from theoretical preliminaries to the core of my preoccupations.
II.

LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATIONS WITH PRESENTATION
OF EVIDENCE

A. The Experiment by Thibaut, Walker, and Lind
This group of researchers has set out to explore whether the
adversary manner of presenting evidence is better suited to
counteracting the decisionmaker's bias than the nonadversary.
Bias was understood as "the tendency to judge too swiftly in
terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. 2 6 It was
concretely structured so as actually to mean the expectation on
the part of the decisionmaker that the criminal defendant is
guilty. Before I make a number of comments on this experiment, and try to assess its significance for my theme, this
stimulating piece of research must be presented in a nutshell.
2'This applies, of course, to jurors. Seeking clarifications later during deliberation
often comes too late.
26 Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, supra note 2, at 390 (quoting Lon Fuller).
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A test case was constructed by the researchers. It involved a
tavern brawl in the course of which one person, later to be indicted, reacted to an assault by using force. The issue raised by
the case was that of the limits of lawful self-defense. Details of
the test case were embodied in fifty brief factual statements, half
of which were designed under a scaling technique to induce a
belief that self-defense was justified, and the remaining half to
suggest that the use of force was unjustified. The decisionmakers
were selected from among college students. In half of them, the
expectation was implanted that the defendant was guilty, while
the other half remained "unbiased."2 7 Panels of student judges
were formed, some with biased and others with unbiased students. They were all instructed about two alternative standards
for decision: in order to repel an attack a person is not justified in using more force than he thinks necessary (a subjective
criterion), or more force than a reasonable person would consider necessary in the circumstances of the case (an objective
criterion). 28 The task of the panels was to decide whether the
violent reaction of the defendant to assault was lawful or not.
Next, stylized models of adversary and nonadversary presentation were constructed. In the simulation of the adversary
mode, the facts were to be announced to the decisionmakers by
two students, seated at separate tables bearing the words
"prosecution" and "defense." One student, the prosecutor, was
to announce the twenty-five factual propositions damaging to
the defendant, while the other, counsel for the defense, was to
relate the twenty-five factual statements favorable to the defendant. In the simulation of the nonadversary presentation, all
fifty factual statements were to be announced by one person
only, but the classification of the facts into two separate groups
was to be maintained. Under both simulated models the decisionmakers were expected to be passive, limited to listening to
the informational input of a third person (or persons). After
completion of some preliminaries that do not concern me here,
the simulated trials took place.
Among the results of this experiment relevant to my discussion, the following were most important. In unbiased judges, the
27 On the technique of "biasing" the subjects, see id. 394.

", The application of these two standards, the first of which probably implies a
higher degree of culpability than the second, creates certain subtle decisionmaking problerns. However, in view of the fact that in simulated trials there is less reluctance to
convict than in actual trials, these problems are probably not too important and shall not
be explored here.
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different presentation of factual statements failed to produce a
statistically significant difference in the determination of guilt.
But in biased judges, there was a statistically significant higher
number of decisions of guilt (i.e., decisions consistent with their
bias) in the simulated nonadversary presentation than in the
simulated adversary presentation. This difference was most pronounced in the interim measurements taken after biased decisionmakers had been exposed, under the nonadversary mode,
to presentation only of the factual statements designed to create
the belief that the defendant was probably guilty. Those exposed
to the adversary presentation better resisted this bias.
In passing now to the discussion of this experiment, I want
to examine only a few aspects of its theoretical foundation, and
to concede the validity of its findings. It appears on first impression that the experiment has supplied valuable data for the
theme that concerns me in this Article. A closer look reveals that
this is not the case.
The researchers tell us that their investigation focused on
two modes of presenting evidence. 29 But, in light of my brief
initital sketch of the adjudicative process, the reader must already have had second thoughts about the accuracy of this claim.
In the experiment, the decisionmakers were not presented evidence and then asked to ascertain facts. Instead, they were conveyed propositions of fact and apparently expected to assume
that these were true. There is no indication in the description of
the study that the decisionmakers were supposed to question the
accuracy of factual propositions that were transmitted to them.
What then is a better description of their activity? They were
supposed to implement one of two very general decisional standards in light of the supplied factual information and were expected to arrive at a decision of guilt or innocence, at a legal
determination. Under the subjective legal standard (whether the
defendant believed that the use of force was necessary) they were
also asked to establish "internal" facts (the beliefs of the defendant). But even on this point there was no outward evidentiary
activity of any sort: The decisionmakers were engaged solely in
inferences and evaluations. Consequently, what the researchers
actually studied was the effect of unilateral as opposed to bilateral announcements to the adjudicator of the results of already
completed evidentiary activity. This, to my mind, more nearly re29

Thibaut, Walkeil, & Lind, supra note 2, at 389.
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sembles closing arguments before the judge than the presentation of evidence to him. 30
Was the experiment addressed to the problem of which arrangement is more likely to produce the truth? Of course not. If
the main activity involved in the simulated adjudication was indeed the making of a legal decision, 3' it stands to reason that this
decision cannot be characterized as "true" or "false" in the same
sense in which this characterization applies to the objects of my
concern-factual findings. Borrowing a phrase from Wittgenstein, one can say that different language games are involved.
Nor were the decisions evaluated in terms of their "coherence"
or "correctness" within the legal universe. No independent
criterion was supplied against which to judge whether the
defendant's reaction to the assault was indeed lawful or not. The
researchers' direct concern was the efficacy of the two different
arrangements in counteracting the adjudicator's bias, understood as an inclination to follow the expection that the defendant
is guilty. It seems, however, that those who designed the experiment may have hoped to provide indirectly some data on the
question of which arrangement leads to greater accuracy. There
is a passage in their text pointing to the widespread belief in the
correlation between the adjudicator's bias (read "expectation of
guilt") and an erroneous decision. 32 But one cannot rule out the
possibility, no matter how unpleasant the thought, that those
who followed their bias made the "correct" finding of unlawfulness, while those who resisted it erred. It would not be the first
33
beautiful assumption slain by ugly facts.
30 Of course, the difference remains that the judge is not expected to assume the
accuracy of the factual underpinnings of the partisan closing arguments.
31 An argument could be made that the supplied "objective" standard for decision
(i.e., what force a reasonable person would believe necessary) involves a factual determination. Although it is true that many such standards could be made the objects of surveys
and similar sociological factfinding techniques, they are actually treated as normative
propositions.
32 See Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, supra note 2, at 390.
.13It is true that an arrangement that better counteracts the adjudicator's predisposition toward guilt is better equipped to minimize the number of false convictions. But
whether such an arrangement leads to the truth in a greater number of cases is another

question. Minimizing the total

nuber oj inaccurate outcomes and minimizingJalse positives

are two different concerns. As long as one remains in the sphere of procedural epistemology, the two issues must not be confused. The question about the optimal distribution of error is based on values other than the desire to establish the truth, and thus falls
outside the purview of this article.
There is another problem, however, that deserves brief mention in connection
with the impact of the decisionmaker's bias in the described experiment. It concerns
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I recognize, of course, that my comments so far may be
more conceptualistic than the subject permits. They may also be
wrong. Let us assume therefore that the researchers were indeed
focusing on the presentation of evidence, and that they were in
fact measuring, albeit indirectly, the truth-finding potential of
the two different evidentiary arrangements. The problem then
becomes whether their two simulated models express the opposition between the adversary and nonadversary development of
evidence. My answer, clearly following from my previous discussion of this contrast, is definitely in the negative.
As I understand it, and mine is not an unorthodox conception, the quintessence of the nonadversary arrangement is that
the decisionmaker be active, that he develop the evidence
himself.3 4 If this feature is absent, so are all the possible advantages of the arrangement. And it is precisely this characteristic of
proof-taking that was not included among the planned variations
used in constructing the simulated models. Under both models
the decisionmakers were passive listeners, a desirable stance only
within the adversary mode. Under both models adjudicators
were exposed to an informational input that neatly classified
factual propositions as either favorable or damaging to the defendant. This again is true only to the adversary style. The only
difference between the two arrangements was that the dividing
line between the two kinds of information was thrown into
sharper relief under what was supposed to be the simulation of
the adversary model, by assigning the announcement of different categories of facts to different persons. The contrast between
adversary and nonadversary modes of presenting evidence can
hardly be found in the simulated model. Nor is the contrast
devised by the researchers expressive of continental as opposed
to Anglo-American styles of arguing before the court. All modern nonadversary systems organize arguments in a disputational
the balanced nature of the test case. The factual basis for the legal decision was in
equipoise: twenty-five propositions suggested guilt and twenty-five propositions
indicated innocence. Jean Buridan would surely claim that this is exactly the situation
he illustrated with his donkey between two equal haystacks: In order to have any
movement, an impetus must first be provided. See M. CLAGETT, THE SCIENCE OF
MECHANICS I THE MIDDLE AGES 537 (1959). The study of bias in this unusual situation

is sui generis. Imagine that the adjudicators in this case were further instructed about
the reasonable doubt standard. It is not inconceivable that, even with biased decisionmakers, the two variations would show no statistically significant difference.
" The researchers recognized this but still believed that their simulation represented
'considerable movement" toward pure models, at least ;vith regard to the nonadversary
system. Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, supra note 2, at 388, 391-94.
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form, and whatever differences remain were not picked up by
the simulation.
In summarizing my comments about the experiment, I am
led to conclude that the researchers promised one thing and
delivered another. They supplied empirical support for the following hypothesis: In close cases a bilateral summation of established facts is better suited than a unilateral one to counteract
the decisionmaker's inclination to render a judgment in accordance with his expectation that the defendant is probably
guilty. They told us nothing about the relative advantages of
adversary and nonadversary modes of presenting evidence in
the divination of truth.
Notwithstanding mislabeling and possible weaknesses of
theoretical preparation, I find the research by Thibaut, Walker,
and Lind very useful and stimulating. My thumbnail sketch of
their experiment was too thin to convey its many, although
debatable, methodological refinements and to do justice to the
ingenuity that went into the research. Inspired by the latter, I
shall offer a cursory sketch of another experiment which may
shed some empirical light on the operation of the two divergent
manners of presenting evidence.
B. An Alternative Test Proposal
If one wants to embark on a study of factfinding accuracy
he must, of course, establish criteria of reality. 35 This is neither
too costly nor overly difficult if simulated trials are contemplated. For instance, having written certain facts into the script,
one could film an event simulating a crime (for example, a manslaughter by a drunken driver), and by careful and repeated viewing of the motion picture compile an exhaustive list of all facts
that a viewer of the film might possibly observe. Criteria have
now been obtained for checking the accuracy of future factual
findings at the simulated trial.
What we need next are witnesses. A number of persons
should be invited to watch the motion picture closely. How this
should be arranged in detail is, of course, a matter for experimental psychologists to decide. A false witness could be pro" By reality I mean the world as mediated by our experience and as locked into the
system of our classificatory scheme. It is this "human" reality, no matter what its ultimate
"true nature," that we are concerned with in the factual segment of criminal law adjudication.
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duced and later planted at the simulated trials to measure the
extent to which false testimony can distort the outcome, if this
variable is of interest.
Finding suitable factfinders and defining their role may be
more difficult. As is known, the nonadversary trial calls for factfinders who are both skilled examiners and adjudicators; such
people are hard to come by in countries where the personal
union of the investigator and the adjudicator is viewed askance.
Even so, it would probably be too pessimistic to expect the problem to be insurmountable. 36 To hold constant factors stemming
from the different composition of various decisionmaking
bodies, single judges seem on many counts to be preferable to
panels.
Much as in the preceding experiment, some judges would
then have to be implanted with an expectation that the defendant is guilty (they would have to be biased). It is true that the
sole task of the judges will be to establish a factual basis for a
finding of guilt, but this by no means implies that factfinding,
even in the context of a simulated trial, is such a "neutral" activity as not to be influenced by bias. 3 7 This bias could be induced,
for instance, by exposing some of the future judges to series of
film clips, designed to induce specific preconceptions about what
usually happens under circumstances similar to those in the
filmed event.
Following the simulated trials, the task of the judges would
be to submit a list of precisely described factual findings about
the event. Naturally, standards of what facts are relevant would
have to be developed and made uniform for all judges, no matter what the mode of trial. The expected decision would be in
the nature of a special rather than a general verdict.
Nonadversary development of evidence would be designed
in such a way that the factfinder would invite witnesses to present a narrative account, and then submit them to interrogation.
There would be a possibility of confronting witnesses whose tes36 If the experiment were conducted in a continental country it would not be difficult to find suitable decisionmakers, but it would be difficult to find examiners qualified
to perform along the lines of the Anglo-American direct- and cross-examinations.
37 How bias can affect factfinding in our context is easy to show. Even if conduct is
not a crime, preconceptions about what has happened influence the factfinder's inquiry
(where he conducts it) and sensitize him more to certain information than to other
information. Expectation also affects the mechanism of "logical completion" of memory
images. See A. TRANKELL, supra note 18, at 18.
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timonies clashed. If thought necessary for effective questioning,
a file containing brief summaries of what witnesses saw could be
supplied to decisionmakers. In order to avoid undue complexity
in an experiment under laboratory conditions, there would be
no subsidiary questioning by counsel, and many other characteristics of the nonadversary model would not be replicated.
The adversary manner of presenting evidence would be
designed to unfold through examination-in-chief and crossexamination of witnesses before a passive factfinder. For this
skilled lawyers would be needed, and each would be assigned a
number of "his" witnesses to prepare for testimony. The
methodological problem would be, of course, how to create a
contest between two counsel. Although the details of the arrangement would require a great deal of ingenuity on the part
of the experimenters, its basic contours seem easily discernible.
For: instance, lawyers could be divided into two groups; one
would be invited to try to prove the factual basis for a conviction
on the manslaughter charge, the other to establish the facts supporting a verdict of innocence. At all times the circumstances
would have to be checked to determine whether the factfinding
efforts under the two modes of proof-taking are directed toward
the same facts.
As a result of four variables (adversary versus nonadversary
proof-taking, and biased versus unbiased factfinders) four types
of differently structured simulated trials would have to be held.
The decisionmakers would then be expected, following the
criteria of relevancy, to hand in their factual findings. These
findings would be measured and statistically analyzed, at least
insofar as the findings under the adversary and nonadversary
presentation overlap and concern the same facts. 38
The results could be quite interesting. Those who believe in
the superiority of the continental style would probably expect
that the latter, even when used to a biased judge, would still yield
a more precise factfinding result. Those who believe in the potency of cross-examination would probably expect this weapon to
secure better results even before a biased judge. In any event,
11

It is possible that, notwithstanding the uniform criteria of relevancy, one or

another mode comes up with a richer harvest of facts. For instance, the partisan perspective followed by the adversary system may embrace within its two narrow searchlights a
smaller number of facts than the unfocused narrative of the witness in the nonadversary
system. Accuracy of findings must then be measured only with regard to the factual

overlap.
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data obtained would, I believe, tell us much more about the two
differing styles of proof-taking than the study described before.
III.

A

GLANCE AT A LARGER EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

A much debated problem has now hopefully been presented
in a form susceptible of empirical testing. Quite unrealistically,
let me assume that experimentation has proven conclusively that
one manner of presenting evidence leads to more precise factual
findings than the other. What would be the significance of such
an empirical datum for the question of which evidentiary arrangement is preferable?
As the criminal process is not an untrammeled exercise in
cognition, it does not take much imagination to realize that from
the standpoint of other important values, an epistemologically
inferior technique may on the whole be preferable. Preoccupation with the rationality of one component can be irrational
when judged from the point of view of the entire scheme. 3 9 But
the perspective of such other values does not concern me here,
limited as I am to the sphere of the quest for truth in the criminal process. Observing, then, the presentation of evidence in this
narrow, artificial light, would the datum mentioned above not
put an end to the debate about the relative merits of the two
manners of presenting evidence? To answer this question I
must, before closing, return once again to the object of prooftaking which I touched on in a preliminary fashion at the beginning.

An argument can be made that as we move from the continental to the Anglo-American procedural system, a subtle
change takes place. It used to be much more pronounced than it
is in our century, but its contours are far from indistinct.
Anglo-American decisionmakers are traditionally strongly attached to individualized justice and strive to arrive at the just
3" Elsewhere I have considered a few aspects of the trade-off between the quest for
truth and a few other procedural values. See Damaika, Evidentiar Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models o] CriminalProcedure, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 578-89 (1973). But problems are
much more complex than those of establishing a positive goal and various constraints on
it. It may be that various ingredients that go into the mix of procedural values are not
amenable to analysis at all; their percel)tion may be like artistic perception, impervious to
quantification and systematization. Thibaut, Walker, and Lind hint at an aspect of this
possibility, relying on a passage from Tribe. See Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, supra note 2, at
390 n.14. Presentation of evidence may, on this view, be an activity whose end lies in
itself. If a procedural arrangement becomes indeed such an Aristotelian entelicheia,
evaluating it in terms of outside objectives is titter nonsense. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS
1050a22-35.
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result in the light of concrete circumstances of the case: Justice
to them can hardly be separated from details. The continental
decisionmakers are relatively more concerned about uniformity
and predictability: they are much more ready than the commonlaw adjudicator to neglect the details of the case in order to
40
organize the world of fluid social reality into a system.
This unequal value orientation leaves an unmistakable imprint on decisional standards in the two legal cultures. Those of
the Anglo-American judge are traditionally in the form of
precedents. It is typical of precedents that the decisional standard contained in them can hardly be translated into an abstract
rule. What is important in factual details of such professional
anecdotes can be approached from different perspectives, and
hardly can be stated with precision. 4 1 Meanwhile, standards of
the continental judge are preferably in the form of precise rules,
contained in authoritative texts. The consequence of this difference in standards for factual determination, and therewith for
the object of proof-taking, is not difficult to see. The AngloAmerican criteria of relevancy make the factual basis of a decision closer to social reality, where fact and value are intertwined.
The foundation of the continental decision is drained of much
of the concreteness of real life situations. It is frozen, as it were,
into a relatively artificial world of technical relevancy, untainted
by social conflict. Now, the more one is removed from the fullness of life, the more limited but also the more precise is our
knowledge: there is one fixed perspective. On the other hand,
the closer one remains to the complexity of real life processes,
the more encompassing but also less certain is one's understanding: as in cubism, our sensations come from multiple viewpoints
and there is more than one side to every story. The truth appears elusive, often a matter of feeling and intuition.
If I am right, and there is indeed a subtle discrepancy in the
"realities" constituting the object of proof in the two systems,
then it is only natural that methods of inquiry into such different
realities need not be exactly the same. The continental system
"'

See Dama~ka, Structures of Authority and ComparativeCriminalProcedure, 84 YALE L.J.

483, 509 (1975). See also C. RADBRUCH, DER GEIST DES ENGLISCHEN RECHTS 48 (3d ed.

1956).
" Kuhn has distinguished knowledge embedded in "shared exemplars" from
knowledge embedded in rules. The former is "misconstrued if reconstructed in terms of
rules that are first abstracted from the exemplars and thereafter function in their stead."

T. KUHN, supra note 3, at 192.
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would tend to embrace a paradigm closer to that of scientific
investigation. 42 The Anglo-American system, where truth is so
much a matter of perspective, would tend to espouse a variation
43
of the dialectic method for the divination of the elusive truth.
Note how differently the "scientific" and the "dialectic"
paradigms conceive of the ideal position of the judge. In the
continental jurisdictions, the judge who has prior knowledge of
the case will not automatically be viewed with suspicion. He is,
mutatis mutandis, like a scientist who, by having formed tentative
theories about the object of his exploration, has not thereby surrendered his claims to impassivity. Only when he has a personal
stake in the decision, or when his mind is closed on the case, may
there be a ground for disqualification. 44 In the Anglo-American
system, prior knowledge of the case on the part of the judge is
more readily associated with bias. The reasons for this are quite
straightforward. If the judge obtains knowledge about the case
independently of the dialectical process of courtroom inquiry, he
can hardly decide which side emerged victorious from the disputation about the truth; he will be siding all the time with the
party whose version of the facts accords with his independent
knowledge. 45 Nor is this all. Quite ominously, the two parties will
no longer be stimulated to invest their energies in a full adversary clash, for that method of inquiry will no longer be decisive,
having formed a m~salliance with an alien epistemological
approach.

46

42 And, because the legal system is more closed, formal logic becomes a very potent

weapon of argument and analysis.
'3 And, because the legal system is more open-ended, formal logic loses a great deal
of its importance. See, e.g., M. MARKOVIc, FROM AFFLUENCE TO PRAxis 32, 33 (1974).
44 Consequently, the main approach on the continent is not to deny the judge familiarity with the dossier, but rather to make the dossier shorter so that no final opinion on tla
case can be obtained form its study. See J. HERRMANN, supra note 1, at 397-401.
1 Continentals are often puzzled at the requirement that jurors have no knowledge
of any facts whatsoever. A good example of this was the continental reaction to the voir
dire in the trial of Jack Ruby, who was seen by millions on TV to have shot Lee Harvey
Oswald. What does the Anglo-American system want, a continental mind is inclined to
ask? Surely it does not want that the courtroom process of truth divination come up with
a finding contrary to the TV "reality." Why then should the Anglo-American system
assume that those who know about the killing will be partial judges in other matters that
must be determined?
46 The particular conception of bias found in the Anglo-American system surfaces in
the study by Thibaut, Walker, and Lind. The orientation of their "comparative" research
has a built-in common law slant. But, for the same reasons, the research paradigm
suggested by me expresses a continental perspective, in that the fragmentation of the
"totality" of adjudication, and the emphasis on precise determination, do less violence to
the continental than they do to the Anglo-American system of administering justice.
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In light of this discussion, what is the significance of empirical data telling us that one mode of presenting evidence leads to
more precise factual findings than another? It is obvious that this
small empirical pied-d-terre does not take us very far, even within
the limited horizons of procedural epistemology. This is not,
however, to imply that efforts at gaining empirical information
on evidentiary arrangements are of no consequence at all. Even
when empirical information is available, the debate mentioned at
the beginning of this article will, of course, go on. But it will be
conducted on a partially more objective basis, with the help of at
least some verifiable criteria. Claims like the Wigmorean one that
''cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth" 47 could then be analyzed with more
understanding and accepted less on faith. And, if one believes
that a dose of skepticism about one's own system is healthy, this
in itself is no small gain.
47 5 J. WIGN.ORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 1940).

